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ABSTRACT 
Over the last decades, venture capital investment management has considerably become 
interested in high-tech investing. Despite this higher interest, no clear analysis exists of who 
these high-tech VCs are, and how they differ from traditional VCs. Studying selection 
behaviour of VCs using a conjoint methodology, we identified 28 high-tech investors in a 
unique sample of 68 European early stage investors. These VCs emphasize high-tech related 
criteria during the selection process. A further analysis of this group of high-tech investors 
compared to traditional investors showed that high-tech VCs are to a larger extent publicly 
funded than traditional VCs. Besides, they tend to be more prominent in biotech investing. We 
found no indication that specific or general human capital with respect to high-tech investing 
affects selection behaviour. This research has important implications for public policy, aiming 
at resolving the market failure for high-tech investments, high-tech entrepreneurs looking for 
VC funding, and VC funds.   
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INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly agreed that over the last decades, venture capital investing 
management has to a large extent diversified into high-technology investing. The extent to 
which and the speed at which this has happened however are different across the world. 
In the US and Canada, nowadays, approximately 90% of all venture capital 
investments are made in technology investments (Cumming, 2007). Until the early 1990s, 
there was very little venture capital activity in Europe, but this has substantially grown in the 
second half of the decade (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002). The venture capital industry that 
existed at the start of the 1990s in the UK and continental Europe was largely non-technology 
focused and dominated by management buy-outs and other later-stage development activity 
(Lockett et al., 2002). The share of early stage and high-tech investments has also increased 
over time, moving closer to the US pattern (Da Rin et al., 2006), but showing a fall in fund-
raising and investments at the turn of the century (Knockaert, 2005). Moreover, venture 
capital firms remain considerably less numerous than in the US, despite a reduction in the gap 
during the mid 1990s (Da Rin et al., 2006). Murray and Lott (1995) and subsequently Lockett 
et al. (2002) indicate that in the EU, by the year 2000, the venture capital industry has evolved 
to a robust and highly international, specialist investment community. Both studies however 
indicate that venture capital firms in the UK have a bias against investment in new technology 
based firms.  
It is therefore clear that the European venture capital industry has only recently 
evolved, and besides has, over a relatively short time frame, become increasingly involved in 
high-tech investments, but is still more reluctant than the US VC industry to invest in early 
stage high tech ventures. This study aims at understanding what the drivers for high-tech 
investing are and aims at understanding what distinguishes high-tech investors from the more 
traditional VCs. 
In order to distinguish high-tech investors from traditional ones, this paper takes a 
study of selection behaviour of early stage VCs as a starting point. Selection behaviour of 
VCs has been studied over many decades, using different techniques and different angles. 
Researchers studying investment behaviour of VCs have to a large extent focused on selection 
behaviour of VCs, and have discovered that important criteria on which VC investors base 
their investment selection decisions are the human capital of the entrepreneur and the 
entrepreneurial team, the market environment, the characteristics of the product and service 
and the financial criteria.  
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Interestingly, to our knowledge, no research has focused on what distinguishes high- 
tech investors from the more traditional VCs, even though many authors, including Lockett et 
al. (2002); Murray and Lott (1996); Baum and Silverman (2004), have pointed out that high-
tech investing is different from non-tech investing. Even though many researchers (f.i. 
Avnimelech and Teubal, 2006) have used the term high-tech investing, no clear insight has 
been provided into what makes high-tech investors distinct from traditional investors.  
This research aims at understanding what makes high-tech VCs different from 
traditional VCs by assessing selection behaviour of a set of 68 European early stage VCs, and 
by, in supplement to other studies, adding tech-related selection criteria during the assessment. 
By adding such criteria, we are able to analyze the extent to which VCs that focus on high-
tech characteristics of a business proposal during the selection process are different from 
traditional VCs. In line with the newest research techniques studying decision processes, we 
carried out face-to-face interviews with VCs, employing conjoint methodology to assess the 
selection procedure used. Besides, these interviews enabled us to capture information on the 
fund characteristics, human capital characteristics of the investment manager, and information 
on the portfolio companies selected and managed by this investment manager. In contrast to 
previous research on VC selection behaviour, we do not assume that the selection behaviour 
exhibited by one single investment manager is representative for the fund’s selection 
behaviour, and take both fund level and human capital characteristics into account throughout 
the analysis.  
First, this paper provides an overview of VC selection behaviour literature and 
illustrates how, by adding specific high-tech selection criteria a taxonomy of high-tech 
investors can be built. Second, the paper provides a theoretical framework for differences 
between high-tech investors and traditional investors, and offers hypotheses on these 
differences. Third, methodology and data collection are described. Fourth, the results of the 
analyses are discussed. The paper ends with conclusions and directions for further research.  
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TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF HIGH-TECH INVESTORS 
Existing research has identified a number of important criteria on which VC investors 
base their investment selection decisions. First, the “human capital” of the entrepreneur and 
the entrepreneurial team, which includes: (a) the ability of management, whether it is 
management skill, quality of management, characteristics of the management team or the 
management track record (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1998); (b) the management skills of the 
entrepreneur (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al., 1985; 1987); and (c) the 
heterogeneity of the entrepreneurial team (Keeley and Roure, 1989). Second, the market 
environment, which includes the characteristics of the market/industry (Hisrich and 
Jankowitz, 1990), environmental threats to the business (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Meyer et 
al., 1993), the level of competition (Hutt and Thomas, 1985; Kahn, 1987; Muzyka et al., 
1996) and the degree of product differentiation (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Hutt and Thomas, 
1985; Kahn, 1987; Hisrich and Jankowitz, 1990). Third, are characteristics of the product / 
service (Macmillan et al., 1987). Fourth, are financial criteria and exit opportunities 
(Macmillan et al., 1987). 
The methodology that has been used to study selection behaviour has evolved over the 
last decades. So far, the most common approach to study selection behaviour has been a post 
hoc methodology which consisted effectively of asking why investment managers had 
invested in certain business proposals. This method, however, is problematic as it can 
potentially generate biased results because people are poor at introspection (Shepherd and 
Zacharakis, 1998), are often motivated to bias results in a post hoc rationalisation (March and 
Feldman, 1981), and have limited capacity to recall what has happened (Fischhoff, 1982). As 
a reaction to these post hoc methods, researchers started to experiment with real time methods 
such as verbal protocol analysis. For example, Hall and Hofer (1993) presented four venture 
capitalists six protocols for assessment. They found that VCs screen and assess business 
proposals very rapidly which makes it unlikely that they can persistently evaluate their 
decisions post hoc. In a further development, the subjectivity of analysis and interpretation 
involved in verbal protocol techniques, without being supplemented with other techniques 
such as computer algorithms, has been questioned by Riquelme and Rickards (1992). They 
argue that verbal protocol analysis is more an art than a science; suggesting instead the use of 
conjoint analysis as a technique for the analysis of VCs’ decision making.  
7 
 
For an overview of studies into selection criteria and the methodology used, we refer 
to Shepherd and Zacharakis (1999). They bring forward that, in order to overcome the 
weaknesses of post hoc methodologies and real time methods, conjoint analysis is highly 
suitable.  
Consistent with Muzyka et al. (1996), we analyze the investment behaviour of VCs by 
investigating the trade offs made by them at the moment they take the decision as to whether 
or not to further investigate an initial proposal, using conjoint methodology. This research 
however starts from the premise that high-tech investing is different from non high-tech 
investing. Besides, in contrast to Muzyka et al. (1996), this research takes into account that 
early stage investing was found to be different from late stage investing (Elango et al., 1995; 
Sapienza et al., 1994), and focuses on early stage VCs only. Furthermore, it takes into account 
that, also in Europe, a new breadth of VC investors has emerged that can be called high-tech 
investors, and therefore includes a set of high-tech related selection criteria to the traditional 
set of selection criteria outlined above. 
Based on the conjoint analysis results, we call those VCs that emphasize the high-tech 
related selection criteria during the selection procedure “high-tech investors”. Subsequently, 
we look at the differences that exist between early stage high tech and early stage traditional 
investors. In order to do so, we assess fund characteristics and human capital characteristics of 
the interviewed investment manager. In the next section, we offer the theoretical background 
and hypotheses for differences between high-tech and traditional early stage VCs.   
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Theory provides a number of indications of how high tech VCs could differ from 
others. Below, we build on agency theory, and related market imperfections, human capital 
theory and exit mechanisms. 
 
Imperfections in capital markets and public intervention  
Early stage high tech firms are seen as important to an economy, given that they are 
offering a significant potential contribution in four cardinal areas of economic activity: 
innovation, new employment creation, export sales growth and regional development 
(Freeman, 1983; Oakey et al., 1988). Many of these companies however find it difficult to get 
started and grow (Gill et al., 2002; Martin et al., 2002), especially in Europe.  
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The dominant view is that this is due to the nature of capital markets and the problems 
of raising finance for small risky businesses (Martin et al., 2002). 
Di Giacomo (2004) and Lerner (1999) indicate that public intervention in the equity 
market is justified mainly by the existence of market failures in the financing of some 
categories of firms, such as high-tech small firms, young enterprises and firms located in 
depressed areas. According to this market failure hypothesis, asymmetric information explains 
the existence of financial gaps: high tech start-ups do not have access to funding by banks, VC 
firms, or other private financing institutions because they are considered too risky and have 
little collateral. Therefore, VCs are often viewed as the primary source for inventive high-tech 
start-ups companies (Gompers and Lerner, 1999, 2001). Many researchers have pointed out 
that venture capital is a form of financial intermediation particularly well suited to support the 
creation and growth of early stage high tech companies (Hellmann and Puri, 2000, 2002; 
Kortum and Lerner, 2000). 
From an agency theory perspective, VCs may however be reluctant to invest in early 
stage high-tech companies. Entrepreneurs, by virtue of being intimately involved in their 
venture, are likely to possess greater information about it than are VCs who may find it difficult 
to access this information even with extensive due diligence. This information asymmetry leads 
to agency conflicts (Gompers, 1995). Agency theory suggests that although the entrepreneur 
can autonomously take certain decisions, part of the costs resulting from these decisions will 
be borne by the remaining shareholders, giving rise to problems of moral hazard. Agency 
costs may be especially important in high tech companies, where investors usually cannot 
evaluate the technology and have difficulties in assessing the commercial implications of 
strategic choices (Knockaert et al., 1996).  
Governments can rectify market imperfections that exist with respect to the provision 
of early stage high tech financing by using a large number of instruments, ranging from the 
establishment of public funds to providing financing to private funds, over refinancing and 
guarantee schemes to the provision of fiscal incentives and incubation schemes (Wright et al. , 
1996). Given the high suitability of venture capital financing for early stage high tech 
companies, governments have to a large extent either provided VC financing directly by 
setting up private funds, or indirectly, by investing in private VC funds (Cumming, 2007).  
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Building on agency theory, there is a clear indication that market failures take place in 
the case of early stage high-tech investments. Given that policy makers strive to provide 
adequate funding for these high-tech ventures, assuming their importance for achieving 
economic growth and job creation, we offer the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: High-tech VCs will to a larger extent be publicly funded than traditional VCs 
 
Human capital theory 
Previous studies on VC selection behaviour have mainly studied responses provided 
by one investment manager, and drawn conclusions for the VC fund’s selection behaviour 
based on these responses. Human capital theory however provides a rationale of why 
individual responses may deviate from a fund’s selection behaviour, and provides insight into 
how high-tech investors may differ from traditional investors.  
Two key demographic characteristics, education and experience, underlie the concept 
of human capital (Becker, 1975). Applying the human capital concept in a VC context, Dimov 
and Shepherd (2004) distinguished between general and specific human capital. General 
human capital refers to overall education and practical experience, while specific human 
capital refers to education and experience with a scope of an application limited to a particular 
activity or context (Becker, 1975; Gimeno et al., 1997). In a VC context, Dimov and Shepherd 
define specific human capital as education and experience that is directly related to the tasks 
of the VC. In the context of this study, focusing on high-tech investing, we define specific 
human capital as experience or education in high-tech domains. 
Second, we build on self-efficacy theory and the “similar-to-me” hypothesis (Byrne, 
1971) to explain how the human capital of investment managers may influence their selection 
behaviour. Self-efficacy theory suggests that people who think they can perform well at a task 
do better than those who think they will fail (Gist and Mitchell, 1992). Subsequently, people 
perform activities and pick social environments they judge themselves capable of managing 
(Wood and Bandura, 1989). According to the “similar-to-me” hypothesis (Byrne, 1971), 
individuals rate other people more positively the more similar they are to themselves. A 
rationale for this hypothesis can be found in three different theoretical backgrounds, namely 
learning theory, self-categorization theory and social identity. According to learning theory, 
similarity is perceived as rewarding and dissimilarity works as a negative reinforcement 
(Lefkowitz, 2000).  
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Self-categorization theory implies that a person’s self-concept is based on the social 
categories he puts himself or herself in and that each person strives for a positive self-identity 
(Jackson et al., 1991). According to social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982), people strive to 
belong to a group as this leads to the positive feeling of social identity. The assignment to a 
specific group allows for in-group/out-group comparisons which are biased towards the own 
group. The impact of the “similar to me” hypothesis has been demonstrated in many 
management fields, such as buyer-seller relationships (Lichtenthal and Tellefsen, 2001) and 
employment selection interviews (Anderson and Shackleton, 1990). 
Building on self-efficacy theory, we can hypothesize that those investment managers 
that are most familiar with high technology, and have thus generated specific human capital 
with respect to high tech investing, will emphasize high-tech criteria in the selection process. 
Subsequently, the “similar-to-me” hypothesis indicates that investment managers who possess 
specific human capital with respect to high tech investing, will have a bias during the 
selection process, and will be more positive towards high-tech entrepreneurs who have a 
similar background. Specific human capital in this context is defined as technical education 
and experience in a high tech research environment. General human capital in this high-tech 
VC context is defined as education in humanities, and experience in finance, consulting or 
investment management.  
 
Based on self-efficacy theory and the “similar-to-me” hypothesis, we offer the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H2: The degree of specific human capital of the investment manager with respect 
to high-tech investing will be higher in the case of high-tech investors 
 
H3: The degree of general human capital of the investment manager with respect 
to high-tech investing will not distinguish high-tech investors from traditional 
investors 
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Accessibility of complementary assets and exit scenarios for VCs 
There are a number of ways in which VCs can exit their investments. For VCs, an IPO 
represents an attractive exit mechanism (Black and Gilson, 1998) and contributes greatly to 
the upside potential of a fund’s performance. An alternative exit route is a trade sale, during 
which the portfolio company is sold to another investor or commercial party. Finally, VCs 
exit the portfolio company through liquidation or bankruptcy.  
There are two main routes to valorize the knowledge or technology built within an 
early stage company. Building on Teece (1986)’s seminal work, Gans and Stern (2003) define 
two types of markets that companies can play on: the market for ideas and the market for 
products. In the first case, the company collaborates with a partner that holds power in the 
value chain and that markets the product. In the latter case, the company develops all 
complementary assets that are necessary to bring the product to market, such as production, 
marketing and distribution facilities and complementary technologies. In this case, the 
company enters into competition with the existing parties on the market and offers a product 
or service on the market. The extent to which this occurs is highly dependent on the 
appropriability regime of the technology and the accessibility of complementary assets in the 
value chain.  
In the case the company plays on the market for technology, it will enter in 
collaboration with an existing party on the market. This collaboration can take many forms, 
and has been studied in large extent by technology management literature (for an overview, 
see Williamson, 1985; Hart, 1995; Aghion and Tirole, 1994). One of these forms is 
acquisition, by which the technological innovator is acquired by an incumbent (Gans and 
Stern, 2003; Tellis, 2006).  
According to Gans and Stern (2003), the extent to which a start-up company will 
either play on the market for technology or products is dependent on the importance of the 
protectability regime and the accessibility of complementary assets. Besides, they stress that 
the impact of these two factors will be highly dependent on the sector the company is in. 
Gans, Hsu and Stern (2002) showed that the probability of cooperation is highest in the 
biotechnology industry, where patents are relatively effective in protecting IPR and firms face 
high relative investment costs. They indicate that, in contrast, when investment costs for the 
entrant are relatively low and the technological innovation is not protected by patents, as in 
the disk drive industry, the disclosure threat tends to foreclose the ideas market.  
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Also Orsenegio (1989) and Lerner (1999) and Merges (1998) indicated that 
cooperation between start-up innovators and more established firms is the norm (whether 
through licensing, strategic alliances, or outright acquisition) in biotechnology. In this way, 
start-up innovators avoid duplicating of sunk assets in biotechnology, such as regulatory 
expertise and distribution channels of established pharmaceutical companies (Gans, Hsu and 
Stern, 2002). Gans and Stern (2003) indicated that the majority of new products approved by 
the FDA are based on discoveries developed with the tools of biotechnology, and that are in 
most cases innovative outputs of research-oriented biotechnology firms in collaboration with 
an incumbent pharmaceutical firm in the commercialization process. Therefore, we can 
hypothesize that a biotechnology start-up firm will most probably play on the market of ideas 
and the exit focus of the VC investor will be on a trade sale scenario. However, in order to 
make this trading of developed technology possible, it is important that the appropriability 
regime of the developed technology is sufficiently strong. Therefore, the VC will stress 
characteristics of the developed technology during the selection process to a large extent in 
the case of a biotechnology proposal. In the case of potential ICT investment, the VC may pay 
less attention to technology characteristics in the business proposal. Indeed, as Mann and 
Sager (2007) and Gans et al. (2002) indicate, protectability of developed technology in the 
ICT sector is less straightforward and appropriability regimes are weaker for this type of 
technology. Besides, ICT innovators in more often engage in creative destruction, earning 
their innovation rents through product market entry and competition with more established 
firms (Christensen, 1997). The weak appropriability regime of ICT developments and the 
accessibility of complementary assets therefore make it less likely that an ICT start-up will 
play on the market for ideas. Therefore, the VC investor will less emphasize characteristics of 
the developed technology during the selection process in the case of an ICT proposal, but will 
focus on those characteristics in the business proposal that determine whether or not the start-
up can enter in competition with existing players on the market. Therefore, we offer the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H4: High-tech investors will be most prominent in biotech investing 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The sample 
Given that none of the publicly available databases and information sources on VC 
activity in Europe, such as VentureEconomics or VentureOne could provide sufficiently 
detailed information on the level we required, namely fund characteristics and investment 
management characteristics, we constructed our own dataset of European early stage VCs. 
A stratified sample of 68 VC investors was drawn from different regions across 
Europe. As our research focus is on early stage VC investors, we needed to obtain an 
international dataset because the number of potential respondents within any one country, 
outside of the US, would have been too small. We selected the seven regions across Europe 
that had the highest R&D intensity and venture capital presence. The seven regions were: 
Cambridge/London region (UK), Ile de France (France), Flanders (Belgium), North Holland 
(the Netherlands), Bavaria (Germany), Stockholm region (Sweden), Helsinki region (Finland). 
In each region, we wanted to have a representation of small and large funds with various 
degrees of public funding. A random sample based upon the most widespread available 
sample frame, i.e. the EVCA-filings, would have resulted in a sample biased towards the 
larger private venture capital firms. Therefore, we created our own sample frame, collating the 
directory information from EVCA with those of the various regional venture capital 
associations and information obtained through contacts we had with academics specific 
regional expertise and contacts. This resulted in a population of 220 funds across the 7 
regions.  These were all funds that are investing early stage. The sample frame was stratified 
into different groups or subpopulations according to the scale of the funds (small funds versus 
mega funds) and their institutional investors. In terms of scale, 33 funds were small, 21 were 
large and 14 were mega funds1. With respect to institutional investors, 6 funds were private 
equity arms of banks, 9 funds were public funds, 12 were public/private partnerships and the 
others are private funds. 
 
                                               
 
1
 Venture funds having a fund size between 100 million Euro and 250 million Euro are considered to be large 
funds for venture investments. Mega funds are those funds having a size of more than 250 million Euro, small 
funds have less than 100 million Euro under management (EVCA definition) 
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Research design 
The interviews were conducted from January to December 2003. Each interview lasted 
on average 90 minutes, and provided information on selection behaviour, human capital 
characteristics of the investment manager and portfolio companies.  
Using a conjoint method we presented the venture capitalists with a number of 
fictitious business proposals that differ across a range of attributes. The first stage of the 
analysis was to identify the different attributes that would be at the heart of the fictive 
business cases. The attributes were selected as follows. First, we synthesized the criteria that 
had been used in previous research, namely human capital characteristics, financial criteria 
and product/technical characteristics. Second, we drew on the insights of two VC and one 
business angel investors active in the early stage high tech sector and in addition three VC 
experts in order to draw up a list of criteria that were important to them, in order to make sure 
that high-tech selection criteria were included. The high-tech selection criteria that were 
included are protectability and platform. Protectability was defined as the ability to protect the 
technology by patents or trade secrets. Platform technology was defined as a broad technology 
with lots of different applications.  
Finally we synthesized the two lists into a set of criteria that we then pre-tested with 
the experts, which they agreed were the criteria that are employed when selecting investments. 
As a result of this process we identified twelve different attributes which included: team, 
entrepreneur, contact with the entrepreneur, uniqueness of the product, protection of the 
product, market acceptance, platform technology, location, size and growth of the targeted 
market, time to break-even and return on investment. 
These twelve attributes were used to construct a range of possible events that would 
form the basis of the fictitious business proposals. In line with the conjoint analysis 
philosophy, and consistent with Muzyka et al. (1996), potential events were matched to the 
different attributes, as shown in Table 1. Thirty events (or levels) were developed 
conceptually based upon the twelve attributes. For instance, team complementarity and 
experience are two important characteristics of the attribute “team”. Business start-up teams 
can thus be categorized into three attributes: not complementary but having business 
experience; complementary with experience; or having neither complementarity nor business 
experience. For other attributes such as uniqueness, only two events are allowed: either it is 
unique or not. 
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Insert Table 1 About Here 
The possible events associated with the twelve attributes summarized in the table can 
then be combined into ‘business proposals’ (or profiles). Theoretically any combination of 12 
(number of attributes) out of 29 potential events is possible. This would result in more than 
1000 theoretically feasible business proposals or profiles. The total number of profiles 
resulting from all possible combinations of the levels would become too great for respondents 
to score in a meaningful way. Therefore, a fractional factorial design using Addelman’s basic 
plans (Addelman, 1962) for designing an orthogonal main effects plan was chosen. This 
resulted in 27 business proposals that were presented to the respondents (VC investment 
managers). The 27 proposals were printed on cards that were used during the interviews. 
Respondents were asked to judge the proposals on a five-point Likert scale (from 1= bad 
investment opportunity I would certainly not invest; to 5= major investment opportunity, large 
chance of investing). Using a conjoint analysis these scores were then translated into derived 
utility scores for each attribute. Utility scores are measures of how important each 
characteristic is to the respondent’s overall preference of a product.  
 
Measures 
A binary logistic regression model was used in order to assess differences between 
high-tech VCs and traditional VCs. The measures used are described below. 
 
Dependent variable 
Using the output of the conjoint analysis, namely the utility scores on the attributes 
and its levels as a starting point, we identified high-tech investors as those investors that were 
either in the top quartile of the sample for the utility attached to protectability of technology or 
in the top quartile of the sample for the utility attached to the fact that the technology was a 
platform technology. In this way, 28 of the 68 VCs were labelled “high-tech VCs”. 
 
Independent variables 
Percentage public capital. This variable ranges between 0% and 100%, with 100% 
indicating that the fund is entirely funded by public means. 46 out of 68 funds were not 
funded by public means, 10 were 100% publicly funded, and the other funds were partially 
publicly funded.  
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Specific human capital. In order to capture the extent to which the investment manager 
disposes of human capital that relates to high tech investing specifically, we constructed two 
variables. The first measures whether or not the investment manager has experience with 
high-technology through means of a PhD (labelled “academic experience”) and takes the form 
of a dummy. The second measures whether or not the investment manager has a technical 
education, and takes the form of a dummy. 7 investment managers had academic experience, 
and 37, or the majority had a technical background. 
General human capital. In order to capture the general human capital, i.e. human 
capital not related to high-tech investing, 5 variables were created. Financial experience is 
measured as the number of years of experience in banking and audit. The investment 
managers interviewed had on average 2.23 years of financial experience. Consulting 
experience is measured as the number of years in consulting, which is on average 1.02 years 
for the investment managers in the sample. Management experience is measured as the 
number of years in general management, on average 4.55 years in our sample. Investment 
management relates to the number of years experience in investment management, which is 
on average 4.68 years in this sample. Finally, education in business administration is 
measured by a dummy variable. 46 of the 68 interviewed investment managers had had this 
education.  
Exit orientation. Given the importance of the sector of investment on exit orientation, 
and the hypothesized relation between the biotechnology focus of the investment manager and 
the emphasis on high-tech selection criteria, we constructed a variable to measure the biotech 
focus. We classified an investment manager as “biotech investor” if he or she indicated to 
consider biotech investments. The degree of focus on biotech was then determined by using 
the function biotech investor (0/1)/number of investment sectors. The investment manager 
indicated whether or not he or she would consider investing in each of the investment sectors, 
which were defined using the EVCA industry classification in 8 sectors2. Therefore, 
investment managers that would only consider biotech investments would score high on the 
measure for biotech focus. Investment managers involved in a diversified set of sectors would 
score low. The average score for biotech focus was .26. 
 
                                               
 
2
 Communications, computer related, other electronics related, biotech, medical/health related, energy, chemicals 
and materials, industrial automation 
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Control variables 
Fund age. First, we controlled for the age of the fund, on average 8.06 years in our 
sample 
Fund size. Second, we controlled for the fund size, measured as the total capital 
managed, on average 269.49 million Euros in our sample.  
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 provides an insight into the descriptives of variables used and the correlation 
between these variables. Correlations between independent variables were all below 0.6. In 
order to make sure that multicollinearity was not an issue, VIF factors were calculated, and 
were found to be below 3.0, suggesting that multicollinearity was not an issue (see Hair et al, 
1998). 
 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
Table 3 presents the results of the binary logistic regression analysis, with as 
dependent variable a dummy (0/1) indicating whether or not the investor was classified a 
high-tech investor or not. This classification was based upon the utility of high-tech selection 
criteria for investment managers during the selection process.  
Insert Table 3 About Here 
However, given that researchers studying selection behavior of VCs taking cognitive 
learning processes as point of departure have noted that the selection procedure and criteria 
put forward by investment managers during their research is different from the actual 
procedure and criteria used, we deemed it necessary to additionally test whether or not 
classification used matched with the in use decision policy of the investment manager. As 
Shepherd (1999) puts it, there is a gap between “In Use” and “Espoused” decision policies 
used by VCs. First, this gap is caused by the fact that it is difficult for VCs to truly understand 
their intuitive decision process because of all the noise caused by information overload 
(Zacharakis and Meyer, 1998). Second, investment managers suffer from overconfidence.  
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As Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001) point out, more information should enable the 
VCs to assess any potential pitfalls, however, it also makes the decision more complex. Thus, 
more information creates greater confidence, but it also leads to lower decision accuracy.  
In order to test whether the observed selection behavior using conjoint methodology 
matched the in use decision policy, we asked the 68 investment managers to provide us with a 
list of portfolio companies for which they had been involved in the selection process. 37 
investment managers provided us with this list, resulting in 168 portfolio companies. For 
these investee companies, we looked up the number of patents before and after investment. 
The number of patents post-investment correlated significantly positive with the utility the 
investment managers attached to protectability of technology (correlation of .40, P<.05). No 
significant correlation was found for the number of pre-investment patents (correlation of .13, 
P>.10). This is not surprising, given that we only surveyed early stage funds and that it takes a 
number of years before a patent is granted, which however does not prohibit the investment 
manager from assessing the patentability of technology. Therefore, we find an extra indication 
that the observed selection behavior is in line with the in use selection behavior by the 
investment managers interviewed.  
The base model for the binary logistic regression was not statistically significant (R² 
=0.060, P>.10), and neither was the base model including the variable for public funding 
(R²=0.091, P>.10). The base models including human capital characteristics and exit 
orientation were statistically significant. So was the full model (R²=.473; P<.01). In the full 
model, positive significant coefficients were found for the percentage public capital (B=.015, 
P<.10), the experience of the investment manager in investment management (B=.217; P<.10) 
and the biotech focus of the investment manager (B=3.27, P<.01). A negative significant 
coefficient was found for the fund age (B=.114; P<.10).  
Therefore, we can conclude that we find support for H1: high-tech VCs are to a 
larger extent publicly funded than traditional VCs. We do not find support for H2 or H3, 
hypothesizing that specific and human capital characteristics will be different between high-
tech investors and traditional investors. We do find that it are those investment managers that 
have the most experience in investment management that have a higher probability of being 
classified as high-tech investor, which is contrary to the expectations. We do find support for 
H4: high-tech investors are more prominent in biotech investing than in other sectors.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
So far, many researchers have used the term high-tech investing and have indicated 
that high-tech investing is different from traditional investing, however without providing a 
definition to high-tech investing, nor providing an indication for the differences between high-
tech and traditional investors. Using a hand collected, unique dataset of early stage European 
VCs, for which information on selection behavior using a conjoint methodology and their 
fund characteristics and human capital characteristics were available, we were able to 
distinguish high-tech investors from traditional investors based on the emphasis investment 
managers placed on high-tech selection criteria, such as protectability and platform 
technology. First of all, we found that high-tech investors dispose to a higher extent of public 
funding. This higher degree of public intervention may be explained by the fact that it is 
commonly accepted that market failures for financing of high-tech ventures in their early 
stages of development exist. Given that high-tech ventures are however esteemed important 
for innovation and employment generation, governments may want to correct this market 
failure by providing funding for high-tech investors. Second, we do not find that the human 
capital of investment managers is significantly different between high-tech investors and 
traditional ones. Only the experience in investment management seems to differ, with high-
tech investors having a higher degree of investment management experience. It therefore 
seems to be the most experienced investment managers that turn into high-tech investing. 
Clarysse et al. (2007) indicate that the valuation of patents or tacit knowledge at the early 
stage of product development is quite uncertain and poses particular problems for traditional 
venture capital firms. This problem is exacerbated since there is typically little information 
about the acceptability of the product in the market or the size of the market (Manigart et al., 
2000). Therefore, it may be that only the most experienced investment managers, who know 
how to deal with market uncertainty and team related uncertainty, have the capacity to deal 
with technological uncertainty. We do not find any indication that investment managers 
emphasize high-tech selection criteria given their technical background, or are more positive 
towards the evaluation of high-tech entrepreneurs, since they are similar to their own 
background. Most probably, the investment criteria that are put forward by the fund, and that 
are checked during the selection process, for instance in investment committees, have more 
impact than the personal affinity of the investment manager with the investment proposal and 
the entrepreneur. Finally, we find that high-tech investors are much more focused on biotech 
investing than traditional investors are.  
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This may have to do with the fact that, in biotech investing, the exit routes are often 
limited to trade sales, requiring a considerable strength of high-tech criteria. Without for 
instance protectability of technology, the investee company would find it very difficult to 
enter the market for ideas, and cooperate with existing players, and would have to build its 
own value chain and market product and services based on the idea, which is extremely 
difficult in biotechnology, given the need for high regulatory expertise and specialized 
distribution channels.  
 
IMPLICATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper has a number of important implications for policy makers, VC funds and 
investment managers and entrepreneurs.  
First, this research indicates that policy makers are indeed succeeding in their attempt 
to alleviate a market failure with respect to high-tech financing. The funds that receive public 
funding tend to a larger extent to invest their funds in high-tech investments. Given the belief 
that high tech ventures are important for stimulation of innovation and subsequently 
employment generation, it is of great importance to policy makers to gain insight into the 
deployment of government resources and to ascertain that the resources employed reach their 
intended goals. Besides, this research clearly shows that human capital has little impact on the 
extent to which investment managers select high-tech deals. It shows that it is mainly 
experienced investment managers who turn to high-tech investing. Even though, at first sight, 
this indicates that the selection process for high-tech deals will be in experienced hands, it has 
to be noted that high-tech investing has only recently emerged in Europe, and therefore, even 
the most experienced investment managers will only be experienced in traditional investing. 
As Lockett et al. (2002) indicate, high-tech investing requires specialist technology skills. 
This research does not indicate that people with specialist technology skills are the ones 
investing in high-tech deals. More cumbersome even, Knockaert et al. (2006) show that 
human capital highly affects the involvement of investment managers post investment. 
Therefore, policy makers should focus on how, apart from selecting high-tech proposals, 
investment managers can be recruited that have specialist technology skills on the one hand 
and investment management skills on the other.  
Second, this research has a number of implications for VC funds. It indicates that 
investment managers are not biased by their own technical background while analyzing high-
tech proposals.  
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This may indicate that they align to a large extent to the investment policy set by the 
VC fund. It also clearly indicates that investment managers focusing on biotech investing 
understand the importance of high-tech criteria during the selection procedure for the exit 
routes and potential returns for the fund. It should be mentioned though that this research did 
not attempt to analyze the results from the employed selection procedure. It therefore does not 
indicate whether or not the fact that technical knowledge and experience does not lead to a 
higher focus on high-tech selection criteria has a positive or negative impact on fund 
performance. Research by Dimov and Shepherd (2004) however indicates that, in a broad 
sample of US traditional and high-tech investors, over all stages of investment, human capital 
affects the chances of reaching a “home run” or IPO and the chances of “strike outs” or 
bankruptcy of the investee company. Further analysis should indicate whether or not specific 
human capital with respect to high-tech investing results in better or worse investment 
decisions.  
Third, this research has a number of implications for entrepreneurs looking for VC 
financing. From this research it is clear that high-tech investors, who stress strong 
technological criteria in the business plan, exist. This may be of interest to many early stage 
high tech companies, often lacking first customer contracts, a well-established entrepreneurial 
team or clearly identifiable financial prospects. Besides, these high-tech investors can 
especially be found at public funds or funds that are partially publicly funded. Besides, 
entrepreneurs operating in the biotech industry should be aware of the importance attached by 
investment managers responsible for biotech investing to high-tech criteria such as 
protectability of technology.  
To conclude, further research should indicate to which extent the emphasis on high-
tech criteria in the business proposal are beneficiary to the fund’s objectives and leads to 
positive investment returns. Besides, further research should indicate whether differences in 
selection behavior between investment managers within one fund exist, and should shed light 
on the extent to which the fund’s selection procedure is the primary focus of the investment 
manager, hereby overruling any human capital-related selection behavior.  
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TABLE 1 
Trade-off table conjoint analysis 
Characteristics of… Attribute Levels (potential events) 
A) Team 1) Team 1) non complementary and no business experience 
2) complementary and business experience 
3) non complementary and business experience 
B) Entrepreneur  2) Entrepreneur 
 
 
 
3) Contact  
4) leader: yes 
5) leader: no 
6) perseverance: yes 
7) perseverance: no 
8) contact with VC: good 
9) contact with VC:bad 
C) Proposed product 
or service 
4) Uniqueness 
 
5) Market acceptance 
 
10) product is unique 
11) product is not unique 
12) product is accepted by the market 
13) product is not accepted by the market 
D) Technology 6) Protection 
 
7) Platform  
14) protection is possible 
15) protection is not possible  
16) it is a platform technology 
17) it is no platform technology 
E) Targeted market 8) Geography 
 
9) Size 
 
10) Growth 
18) the market is regional 
19) the market is global 
20) it is a niche market 
21) it is a mainstream market 
22) the market is seemingly high growth 
23) the market is low growth 
F) Financial forecast 11) Time to break-even 
 
12) Return on 
investment 
24) expected time to breakeven is less than 1,5 years 
25) expected time to breakeven is more than 3 years 
26) expected time to breakeven is between 1,5 and 3 years 
27) expected return is less than 30%  
28) expected return is more than 50% 
29) expected return is between 30 and 50% 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Percentage public 
capital 
21.68 36.57 1.00        
2. Financial experience 2.23 4.65 .27* 1.00       
3. Consulting experience 1.02 2.03 -.04 -.02 1.00      
4. Management 
experience 
4.55 6.07 .02 -.23 -.04 1.00     
5. Investment 
management experience 
4.86 3.83 .08 -.06 -.23 -.03 1.00    
6. Biotech focus .26 .36 -.03 -.13 -.07 .20 -.03 1.00   
7. Fundage 8.06 9.45 .04 -.02 .01 .01 .25* .11 1.00  
8. Fund capital (million 
Euro) 
269.49 649.36 .17 -.13 .05 -.03 -.09 .02 .41* 1.00 
Note: Pearson correlation for continuous variables, *correlations are significant at p>0.05, n=68 
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TABLE 3: binary logistic regression analysis (0=traditional investor; 1=high-tech 
investor) 
 Base 
model 
Base model + public 
intervention 
Base model + 
human capital 
Base model + exit 
orientation 
Full model 
Public intervention      
Percentage public capital  .009 
(.007) 
  .015* 
(.009) 
Specific human capital      
Academic experience   2.338* 
(1.214) 
 .780 
(1.302) 
Technical education   .236 
(.723) 
 -.004 
(.816) 
General human capital      
Financial experience   -.115 
(.112) 
 -.123 
(.111) 
Consulting experience   .067 
(.143) 
 .110 
(.149) 
Management experience   .051 
(.046) 
 .029 
(.052) 
Investment management 
experience 
  .158* 
(.087) 
 .217* 
(.111) 
Business administration 
education 
  .753 
(.730) 
 .880 
(.856) 
Exit orientation      
Biotech focus    2.888*** 
(.906) 
3.274*** 
(1.153) 
Control variables      
Fund age -.037 
(.001) 
-.052 
(.045) 
-.065 
(.052) 
-.047 
(.044) 
-.114* 
(.068) 
Fund capital .001 
(.041) 
.002 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.003 
(.002) 
      Constant -.338 
(.335) 
-.516 
(.370) 
-1.881* 
(1.132) 
-1.015** 
(.426) 
-2.994** 
(1.407) 
Model      
Chi-Square 3.109 4.736 17.631** 16.745*** 29.373*** 
Concordant Ratio 61.8% 63.2% 73.5% 73.5% 76.5% 
-2Log Likelihood 89.03 87.40 74.508 75.394 62.766 
Cox & Snell R² .045 0.067 .228 .218 .351 
Nagelkerke R² .060 0.091 .308 .294 .473 
Note: Levels of significance: *=0.10; **=0.05; ***=0.01;  
****=0.001; n=68 
 
 
